Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.

Case Details

Status: Decided
Docket No: 10-1399
NCLC Involvement: None
Solicitor General Involvement: None
Sub-Issue:
Industry:
Sub-Industry:
Term: 2011 Term
Oral Argument Date: January 11, 2012
Vote: 8-1
Opinion: Sotomayor

Question(s) Presented

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 ("Longshore Act") provides generally for compensation for total disability in periodic payments at a rate of two-thirds of the "average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury," and for most partial disabilities the same fraction of the difference between that weekly wage and the worker's residual "wage-earning capacity." Id. §§ 8-10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 908-10. But it has always imposed upper and lower limits on the rate payable as so determined. Section 6(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 906(b), provides that the compensation rate cannot be more than twice "the applicable national average weekly wage," as determined for each fiscal year; nor can compensation for total disability be less than the lesser of half the "applicable national average weekly wage" so determined and the worker's full pre-injury earnings. The question which fiscal year's limits are the "applicable" ones is addressed by § 6(c): Determinations under subsection (b)(3) of this section with respect to a [fiscal year] shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period, as well as those newly awarded compensation during such period. 33 U.S.C. § 906(c). The identity of the years whose limits are "applicable" under this provision has divided the two courts of appeals with the heaviest Longshore Act dockets.

The question presented is:

Whether the phrase "those newly awarded compensation during such period" in Longshore Act § 6(c), applicable to all classes of disability except permanent total, can be read to mean "those first entitled to compensation during such period," regard-less of when it is awarded. 

Case Outcome

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgement, ruling that "an employee is 'newly awarded compensa­tion' when he first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to benefits, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on his behalf."  

Justices in Majority
Alito
Breyer
Kagan
Kennedy
Roberts
Scalia
Sotomayor
Thomas
Justices in Minority
Ginsburg
Procedural History

Decided 3/20/12.

Case Documents