Definition of Compensable “Work” Under Fair Labor Standards
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in conflict with the Tenth Circuit, that an activity constitutes "work" under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207, even though the activity neither entails "exertion" nor is compensable as a matter of custom or contract.
NCLC urged the Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit decision addressing the definition of “work” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The litigation over the “donning and doffing” policies of meat processing plants highlights an unresolved issue at the center of myriad other lawsuits affecting the “new economy” – what constitutes compensable “work” under the FLSA. In its brief, NCLC argued that the Supreme Court should clarify that the definition of “work” does not encompass pre-schedule, non-exertive activities, such as booting up a computer.
The Supreme Court declined to review this case.
Amicus brief in support of cert. filed 3/4/08. Cert. denied 6/9/08.