

No. 12-1281

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner,

v.

NOEL CANNING, A DIVISION
OF THE NOEL CORP., ET AL.,

Respondents.

**On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit**

**AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
PROFESSOR VICTOR WILLIAMS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER**

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THRESHOLD QUESTION PRESENTED

In supplement to Petitioner's Questions Presented, Amicus proposes a threshold Question Presented, as follows:

Whether challenge to the President's exercise of his exclusive Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 authority is a nonjusticiable political question.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Threshold Question Presented	i
Table of Contents	ii
Table of Authorities	iv
Interest of the Amicus Curiae	1
Summary of Argument	2
Argument	7
Introduction: Political – Not Legal – Questions	7
I. Textual Commitment to Executive Alone: Recess Appointment Power was Capstone of Framers’ Design for Presidential Predominance in Appointments	9
A. Presidential Predominance in Appointments	10
B. Recess Appointment Authority as the Capstone of Presidential Predominance in Appointments	12
C. Framers’ Functional Efficiencies and Structural Limitations for Temporary Appointments: Allowing “Play in the Joints”	13
II. <i>Nixon v. United States</i> : Applying <i>Baker’s</i> Classical and Prudential Factors	16
A. No Textual Limit: Refusing to Define “try” (or “the Recess”)	16

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued .

	Page
B. Conflicted-Out: Judiciary as Final Arbiter of “Important Constitutional Check” on Judiciary.....	17
III. Dense Political Thicket: Court’s Review Beyond Textual Commitment to Executive Requires Judicial Review of Appointment Obstruction – Holds, Filibusters, and House-Senate Scheduling Schemes.....	21
A. Review of Obstruction that Led to Temporary Commissions	22
B. No Judicially Manageable Standards and No Respect Due	23
C. Third Circuit’s <i>New Vista</i> Creates Nonjusticiability Conflict with Eleventh Circuit’s <i>Evans</i>	24
IV. Finality in Appointments	26
A. Extreme Need for Finality	27
B. <i>Goldwater v. Carter’s</i> Expedient Example	27
Conclusion.....	29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
CASES:	
<i>Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pension</i> , 282 U.S. 489 (1931).....	16
<i>Baker v. Carr</i> , 369 U.S. 186 (1962).....	6, 8, 9, 24
<i>Buckley v. Valeo</i> , 424 U.S. 1 (1976).....	10
<i>Coleman v. Miller</i> , 307 U.S. 433 (1939).....	7
<i>Common Cause v. Biden</i> , 2012 WL 6628951 (D.D.C., Dec. 21, 2012).....	6
<i>Evans v. Stephens</i> , 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005)	24, 25
<i>Freytag v. Commissioner</i> , 501 U.S. 868 (1991).....	10, 13
<i>Gilligan v. Morgan</i> , 413 U.S. 1 (1973).....	7
<i>Goldwater v. Carter</i> , 444 U.S. 996 (1979).....	8, 27, 28
<i>Luther v. Borden</i> , 48 U.S. 1 (1849).....	7
<i>Marbury v. Madison</i> , 5 U.S. 137 (1803).....	7
<i>NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab.</i> , ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 2099742 (3d Cir. May 16, 2013).....	25, 26
<i>Nixon v. United States</i> , 506 U.S. 224 (1993)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Nixon v. United States</i> , 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991).....	27
<i>Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon</i> , 223 U.S. 118 (1912).....	7
<i>United States v. Allocco</i> , 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963)	25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

	Page
<i>United States v. Woodley</i> , 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986)	25
<i>Zivotofsky v. Clinton</i> , 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012).....	8, 15
CONSTITUTION:	
Art. I, § 3, Cl. 6 (Impeachment Trial Clause).....	16, 17
Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2 (Appointment Clause).....	4, 9, 14, 25
Art. II, § 2, Cl. 3 (Recess Appointment Clause)....	<i>passim</i>
Art. II, § 3 (Take Care and Commission Clauses)	2
MISCELLANEOUS:	
Alexander Bickel, <i>The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics</i> (1962).....	17
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, <i>The Senate: Out of Order?</i> , 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1041 (2011).....	5
Mary L. Clark, <i>One Man’s Token is Another Woman’s Breakthrough? The Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges</i> , 49 Vill. L. Rev. 487 (2004)	20
John Cornyn, <i>Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform</i> , 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 181 (2003).....	5
<i>The Federalist No. 67</i> (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)	2, 15
<i>The Federalist No. 76</i> (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)	11, 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

	Page
<i>The Federalist</i> No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)	12
David F. Forte, <i>Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and William Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace</i> , 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349 (1996)	18
Oskar Garcia, <i>Kennedy: Judges' Senate Con- firmation Too Political</i> , A.P. The Big Story, Aug. 15, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ kennedy-judges-senate-confirmation-too-political	24
Michael J. Gerhardt, <i>The Federal Appoint- ments Process: A Constitutional and Histori- cal Analysis</i> (2003)	10
Tom Harkin, <i>Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority Tyranny in Senate</i> , 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (2011)	5
Patrick Hein, <i>In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The Effectiveness of Po- litical Counterweights</i> , 96 Calif. L. Rev. 235 (2008)	28
Seung Min Kim, <i>Senate Gridlocked Over Nominations, Again</i> , Politico, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73038. html	4
Representative Jeff Landry, Letter to the Speaker of the House John Boehner, et al., June 15, 2011)	23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

	Page
<i>Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell</i> (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 <i>Life and Correspondence of James Iredell</i> (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1858).....	12
John O. McGinnis, <i>The President, the Senate, the Constitution and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein</i> , 71 <i>Tex. L. Rev.</i> 633 (1993)	10
Memorandum from William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President (Nov. 28, 1989).....	14
Edwin Meese, III, et al., <i>En Banc Amici Brief in Evans v. Stephens</i> , 2004 WL 3589823.....	4
Edmund S. Morgan, <i>The Birth of the Republic: 1763-89</i> (3d ed. 1992).....	14
Diana Gribbon Motz, <i>The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointment of Article III Judges</i> , 97 <i>Va. L. Rev.</i> 1665 (2011).....	19
Ylan Q. Mui, <i>McConnell To Block ‘Any Nominee’ for Top CFPB Job</i> , <i>Wash. Post</i> , June 10, 2011, at A12.....	4
15 <i>Op. Off. Legal Counsel</i> 98 (1991)	14
<i>The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court of the United States</i> (Nada Mourtaba-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007)	7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

	Page
<i>The Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1798</i> (Max Farrand ed., 1966).....	13
Hon. John G. Roberts, <i>Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary</i> 8 (2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf	24
Fritz Scharpf, <i>Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis</i> , 75 <i>Yale L.J.</i> 517 (1966).....	17
Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800), 18 U.S. app. note I (1820).....	7
Laurence H. Tribe, <i>Games and Gimmicks in the Senate</i> , <i>N.Y. Times</i> , A25 (Jan. 5, 2012).....	5
Laurence H. Tribe, <i>Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation</i> , 108 <i>Harvard L. Rev.</i> 1221 (1995).....	28
36 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 3180 (Dec. 27, 2000).....	21
Russell Wheeler, <i>Is Our Dysfunctional Process for Filling Judicial Vacancies an Insoluble Problem?</i> , ACS Issue Brief, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Wheeler_-_Filling_Judicial_Vacancies.pdf	3
Victor Williams, <i>Averting a Crisis: The Next President's Appointment Strategy</i> , <i>Nat'l L.J.</i> 14 (Mar. 10, 2008).....	5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

	Page
Victor Williams, <i>Estrada: Do a Recess Appointment</i> , Nat'l L.J. 12 (Mar. 10, 2003)	19
Victor Williams, <i>House GOP Can't Block Recess Appointments</i> , Nat'l L.J. 39 (Aug. 15, 2011)	23
Victor Williams, <i>NLRB and CFPB Recess Appointments: Obama's New Year's Options</i> , Huffington Post (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/nlr-and-cfpb-recess-appointments_b_1169657.html	4
Victor Williams, <i>Pro Forma Follies: Obama's Recess Appointment Authority Not Limited by Sham Sessions</i> , Nat'l L.J. 51 (Oct. 11, 2010)	5
Victor Williams and Nicola Sanchez, <i>Confirmation Combat</i> , Nat'l L.J. 34 (Jan. 4, 2010)	3
Gordon Wood, <i>The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787</i> (1969)	9

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

Victor Williams, of Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, writes, in support of the Petitioner's writ of certiorari, to raise an alternative political-question theory.¹ Professor Williams was granted leave to appear below as amicus in *Noel Canning v. NLRB* to raise the nonjusticiability alternative theory. He has also appeared as amicus in related cases before the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit. Professor Williams has researched and published in the area of constitutional law and the federal appointments process for twenty-two years. Amicus' published scholarship and popular commentary has strongly supported the appointment prerogatives of four Presidents without regard to their party affiliation. Amicus has warned of worsening cycles of Senate confirmation dysfunction, and has been particularly critical of the recent purposeful appointment obstruction orchestrated by partisan factions of both the House and Senate. Throughout 2011, Professor Williams advocated for President Barack Obama to use his Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 appointment authority to challenge the appointment obstruction and insure legal authority for the National Labor

¹ Pursuant to Rule 37.2(a), amicus provided timely notice of his intention to file this brief. All parties have consented. In accordance with Rule 37.6, no counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than the amicus, has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Amicus' institutional affiliation is provided only for identification purposes.

Relations Board (NLRB) and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Amicus seeks to prompt a nonjusticiability inquiry during *certiorari* review, and argues for summary reversal of the court of appeals.

◆

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Without duplication, amicus fully endorses Petitioner's reasons for this Court to grant *certiorari* review. Amicus offers an alternative theory for both *certiorari* review and resolution: Respondent's challenge to the President's discretionary exercise of his recess appointment powers is a nonjusticiable political question.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 is a textual commitment of exclusive authority to the President. This textual commitment recognizes that only the Executive has the institutional competence to know when such discretionary appointment action is required to meet his Article II, Section 3 obligation: "[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."

The textual commitment of authority grants the Executive both the responsibility to determine Senate unavailability and the discretion to sign temporary commissions. Alexander Hamilton explained in *Federalist 67* that Clause 3 is "intended to authorize the President *singly* to make temporary appointments." *The Federalist No. 67* at 455 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in original).

If this Court goes beyond the textual commitment of exclusive authority to the President, it will find itself entering the densest of modern political thickets. Cycles of partisan appointment obstruction and subsequent partisan payback have worsened over each of the past four presidencies. During the first years of the Obama Administration, partisan confirmation obstruction by minority factions reached unprecedented intensity.² The political and economic harm of appointment obstruction is significant. Executive departments critical to economic and national security interests have suffered years without leadership. Regulatory agencies have long-standing vacancies and the independent judiciary struggles with many empty benches and caseload emergencies.³

The express goal of the minority obstruction, particularly as directed against the 2011 NLRB and CFPB nominees, was nullification: Extinguish the independent agencies' legal authority by preventing

² See Victor Williams and Nicola Sanchez, *Confirmation Combat*, Nat'l L.J. 34 (Jan. 4, 2010).

³ See Russell Wheeler, *Is Our Dysfunctional Process for Filling Judicial Vacancies an Insoluble Problem?* ACS Issue Brief, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Wheeler_-_Filling_Judicial_Vacancies.pdf.

timely appointments.⁴ The Senate’s ongoing internal conflict has so escalated, and the lodging of holds and filibusters so frequent, that Majority Leader Harry Reid publicly praises the President for his recess appointments and requests that the President “recess appoint all” nominees being denied up-or-down votes by minority factions.⁵

If this Court’s review goes beyond the exclusive textual commitment of authority to the President, it must also examine the constitutionality of the underlying obstruction. It would be a strange justice “to let a *minority* of the Senate escape judicial review of its arguably unconstitutional obstruction, while subjecting to judicial review the President’s response – acquiesced in by the Senate majority – to that obstruction.”⁶ When a minority of just one Senator lodges a hold or a filibuster threat, the Appointment Clause’s simple-majority Senate vote requirement is

⁴ See Ylan Q. Mui, *McConnell To Block ‘Any Nominee’ for Top CFPB Job*, Wash. Post, June 10, 2011, at A12; see also, Victor Williams, *NLRB and CFPB Recess Appointments: Obama’s New Year’s Options*, Huffington Post (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/nlr-and-cfpb-recess-appointments_b_1169657.html.

⁵ Seung Min Kim, *Senate Gridlocked Over Nominations, Again*, Politico, Feb. 17, 2012, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73038.html>.

⁶ Edwin Meese, III, et al., En Banc Amici Brief in *Evans v. Stephens*, 2004 WL 3589823, 9 (emphasis in original).

effectively amended to compel a predicate super-majority cloture vote.⁷

This Court would need to also examine the House majority and Senate minority scheduling collusion designed to withhold adjournment consent to the upper chamber for the purpose of keeping the Senate in pro forma sessions. With obstructionists promoting the myth that a three-day recess minimum was needed to trigger Clause 3 authority, prior sham Senate sessions had been used to bluff the Executive out of using the temporary appointment authority.⁸ The specific objective of the 2011 scheduling gimmick was to block the President from responding to the prolonged confirmation tribulation of NLRB nominee Craig Becker. The President called the obstructionists' bluff, recess commissioned three Board members, including a replacement for Becker; thus restoring the legal authority of the NLRB.⁹

⁷ See generally, Tom Harkin, *Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority Tyranny in Senate*, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (2011); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, *The Senate: Out of Order?*, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1041 (2011); and John Cornyn, *Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform*, 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 181 (2003).

⁸ See Victor Williams, *Pro Forma Follies: Obama's Recess Appointment Authority Not Limited by Sham Sessions*, Nat'l L.J. 51 (Oct. 11, 2010); Victor Williams, *Averting a Crisis: The Next President's Appointment Strategy*, Nat'l L.J. 14 (Mar. 10, 2008).

⁹ See Laurence H. Tribe, *Games and Gimmicks in the Senate*, N.Y. Times, A25, (Jan. 5, 2012) ("The Constitution that has guided our Republic for centuries is not blind to the threat of Congress's extending its internal squabbles into a general
(Continued on following page)

This adjudication is a direct continuation of the ongoing political conflict. In a bold frontal assault, congressional obstructionists appeared as amici and participated in oral argument below. This action attempts to draft the judiciary to actively participate in the political combat.

If this Court's review goes beyond the exclusive textual commitment to the President, it will find no judicially manageable standards to resolve the escalating campaign of appointment obstruction or to measure the deference due to the Senate, if any, when the President signs temporary appointments.¹⁰ Judicial review of the President's recess appointment discretion is also disrespectful and conflictive; the judiciary should not be the final arbiter of the appointment method by which Presidents have strategically benched judges in order to transform courts.



paralysis of the entire body politic, rendering vital regulatory agencies headless and therefore impotent. Preserving the authority the president needs to carry out his basic duties, rather than deferring to partisan games and gimmicks, is our Constitution's clear command.”).

¹⁰ A recent challenge to the Senate's use of the filibuster was analyzed as presenting a nonjusticiable political question based on the three *Baker* criteria argued in this brief. *Common Cause v. Biden*, 2012 WL 6628951 (D.D.C., Dec. 21, 2012).

ARGUMENT

Introduction: Political - Not Legal - Questions

Chief Justice John Marshall provided early guidance¹¹ regarding political-question nonjusticiability: “By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.” *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803). Marshall continued: “Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” *Id.* at 170. Throughout our Republic’s history, this Court has recognized that some constitutional questions are committed by the Constitution to the discretion of the elected political Branches. *See, e.g., Luther v. Borden*, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); *Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon*, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); *Coleman v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); *Gilligan v. Morgan*, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).

¹¹ Three years before his *Marbury* opinion, Congressman John Marshall provided earlier guidance when explaining to his House colleagues that some constitutional questions should only be answered by the elected political Branches. Without such a jurisdictional limit, the political departments “would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800), 18 U.S. app. note I, at 16-17 (1820) (cited by *The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court of the United States* (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain eds., 25 n.10, 2007)).

Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor most recently reiterated the fundamental jurisdictional principle as it has been developed in such modern cases as *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); *Goldwater v. Carter*, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) and *Nixon v. United States*, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). She described how “[t]he political question doctrine speaks to an amalgam of circumstances in which courts properly examine whether a particular suit is justiciable – that is, whether the dispute is appropriate for resolution by courts.” *Zivotofsky v. Clinton*, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1431 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In agreeing with the Court’s holding that interpretation of a statute merely regulating a passport’s contents did not present a political question, Justice Sotomayor focused on *Baker v. Carr* to emphasize the “demanding” inquiry required in a nonjusticiability analysis.

Baker serves as a helpful doctrinal guide for such inquiry as it numerates both classical and prudential strains of judicial abstention. The “separation of power function” is identified “as the common element among the many possible formulations of a political question.” 369 U.S. at 210. *Baker* identified six characteristics “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question,” including, as most relevant here, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” 369 U.S. at 217. The doctrine also precludes judicial review of an issue where there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,” or when it is impossible

for the court to undertake “independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” *Id.*

Nixon v. United States applied *Baker* by instructing that a political question analysis begins with determining “whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed.” 506 U.S. at 228.

The drafting, ratification, and structural logic of Article II, Section 2 prove that the textual commitment of temporary appointment discretion to the Executive is absolute. Additional interrelated prudential factors strongly support that nonjusticiable determination.

I. Textual Commitment to Executive Alone: Recess Appointment Power was Capstone of Framers’ Design for Presidential Pre-eminence in Appointments

Framing the 1787 Philadelphia debate regarding appointments were the unhappy experiences of most of the independent states, which had constitutions mandating that state legislatures appoint officials and judges. “The appointing authority which in most constitutions had been granted to the assemblies had become the principal source of division and faction in the states.” Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787*, 407 (1969). The Convention’s delegates repeatedly considered, and ultimately rejected, all proposals to give the Congress as a whole, or, alternatively, the Senate alone, significant

appointment authority. See *Freytag v. Commissioner*, 501 U.S. 868, 904-08 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring.); *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (per curiam).

A. Presidential Predominance in Appointments

As the state legislature appointment processes “had fallen easy prey to demagogues, provincialism, and factions,” the 1787 Philadelphia Convention delegates “quickly accepted the desirability of a significant Presidential role in making federal appointments.” Michael J. Gerhardt, *The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis* 18 (2003).

The Convention’s final summer judgment was to grant the President a predominant authority over appointments while restricting the Senate to an advisory consent vote to principal officer nominations. The term “Advice” should be read as conjoined with its companion term “Consent”; the Senate advises the President only by its final consensual vote. Such a final vote remains only advisory as the President retains absolute discretion to decide whether to sign the commission.¹²

¹² Contrary to a significant quantity of commentary arguing for an enlargement of the Senate’s role beyond this textual grant, Professor John McGinnis supports an accurately narrow reading of “Advice and Consent” by both textual analysis and reference to early practice. See John O. McGinnis, *The President*,
(Continued on following page)

Obvious by the Recess Appointment Clause's structural logic and functional purpose, the Senate was to have no role in, or interference with, the signing of recess commissions.¹³ A Senate unavailable to render advisory consent is unavailable to advise as to its availability. The two appointment clauses which separately issue a "shall have Power" charge to the President are the method for his Article II, Section 3 "take care" and "commission all officers" obligation.

In *Federalist* writings, Alexander Hamilton favorably described – with "particular commendation" – the creation of a strong appointment authority in the Executive "to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union." *The Federalist No. 76*, at 510-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In explaining the Convention's final decision to restrict the Senate's role to a ratification vote, Hamilton explained that any legislative assembly's "systematic spirit of cabal and intrigue" was incompatible with appointment power. *Id.* at 510.

Hamilton contrasted appointment by a "single well-directed" person who would not "be distracted

the Senate, the Constitution and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 633 (1993).

¹³ Just as with temporary appointments for principal officers, the Senate has no advisory consent function regarding "inferior Officer" appointments once legislation vests appointment authority "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in heads of Departments."

and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body.” *Id.* at 511. While Hamilton promised that the Senate’s advisory consent would serve as an “excellent check” on improper presidential favoritism, he too optimistically assumed “Senate co-operation” done in a “silent operation.” *Id.*

Hamilton affirmed that the House of Representatives should have no appointment role. In *Federalist No. 77*, Hamilton felt obliged to take notice of a “scheme” advocated by “just a few” to give the House influence in the appointment process. *The Federalist No. 77* at 519 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Hamilton accurately predicted that House appointment involvement would manifest “infinite delays and embarrassments.” *Id.*

B. Recess Appointment Authority as the Capstone of Presidential Predominance in Appointments

The capstone of the Philadelphia Convention’s design to give the President a predominant authority in appointments came from North Carolina Delegate Richard Dobbs Spaight.¹⁴ During the most critical

¹⁴ Richard Spaight is better known to legal history for communicating with James Iredell urging judicial restraint and judicial deference to the political Branches. See *Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell* (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 *Life and Correspondence of James Iredell*, at 168, 169-70 (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1858).

day of the long summer's many debates regarding appointments, the final accord was struck for ordinary appointments by restricting the Senate's role to simple-majority vote ratification. Spaight then moved to grant the President unilateral appointment authority when the Senate was unavailable to attend to its advisory consent duty. The delegates immediately and unanimously accepted the grant of exclusive term appointment authority for the President. 2 *The Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1798*, 539 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).

Spaight's motion prompted no additional Convention debate; it was integral to the delegates' structural and functional design for Executive appointment authority. The appointment authority would remain vested and operable at all times for all purposes; regardless of the Senate's attendance to its duties. It was a "power of appointment lodged in a President . . . to be exercised independently, and not pursuant to the manipulations of Congress." *Freytag v. Commissioner*, 501 U.S. at 907 (Scalia, J., concurring).

C. Framers' Functional Efficiencies and Structural Limitations for Temporary Appointments: Allowing "Play in the Joints"

The core purpose of the 1787 Convention was to redesign the central government to better address the problems of a new nation. The Framers sought to remedy the chief institutional defect in the Articles of

Confederation by formally separating executive authority from the Congress. Edmund S. Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic: 1763-89*, 129-44 (3d ed. 1992). The Confederation Congress had failed badly in its attempts to administer the new Republic. Neither specially-constituted congressional committees nor congressionally-appointed administrators had been successful in executing the law. *Id.* at 123-28. Article II, Section 2 was drafted to provide effective and practical governance through a strong Executive with predominate authority over all principal officer and judicial appointments, and a sole temporary commissioning authority to always insure a fully staffed government and judiciary.

The Framers gave the Clause 3 appointment option generous functional efficiencies which are dependent on no Senate role and which allow no Senate interference. The temporary appointment lasts until the end of the next session without Senate ratification needed, or Senate revocation allowed, during that period. The Framers did not prohibit successive recess commissions.¹⁵ Nor did they restrict the function or power of temporary officials.

¹⁵ Presidents have not infrequently made re-recess appointments. See 15 *Op. Off. Legal Counsel* 98 (1991) ("It is well-established that the President may make successive recess appointments to the same person.") (quoting Memorandum from William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, at 2 (Nov. 28, 1989)).

The Framers did not include specificity to restrict the duration or type of Senate unavailability, or the timing of a vacancy occurrence necessary for the authority to be triggered. Rather, they charged the President with a broad authority to insure that the federal appointment method would always remain *adequate* to keeping a fully staffed government. Alexander Hamilton explained that the unilateral Executive authority was for those “cases to which the general method was inadequate.” *The Federalist No. 67* at 455 (Cooke ed., 1961).

With such functional efficiencies, it is also important to consider limiting principles inherent in Clause 3’s operation. Such limitation is first found in the duration of the appointment. A temporary term of up to 24 months, while significant, is less than a several-years’ term of a confirmed departmental office, the many-years’ term of an independent agency posting, or the life-tenure office and salary of a confirmed Article III judge. Other limitations are found in possible Senate pushback (e.g., strategically terminating its current session or withholding of confirmation cooperation). The Congress has many other ways and means of checking the President in the dynamic relationship between the political Branches. See *Zivotofsky v. Clinton*, 132 S. Ct. at 1441 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

The wisdom of the Framers’ final judgment on appointments was that the Clause’s efficiencies and limitations work together to allow what (recess-appointed) Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,

Jr. described as a requirement for constitutional government: “We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.” *Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pension*, 282 U.S. 489, 501 (1931).

II. *Nixon v. United States: Applying Baker’s Classical and Prudential Factors*

In *Nixon v. United States*, the Court rejected, as nonjusticiable, a debenched federal judge’s challenge to the Senate’s questionable exercise of its Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 “sole” duty to “try” all impeachments.

A. No Textual Limit: Refusing to Define “try” (or “the Recess”)

The *Nixon* Court refused to review a procedurally problematic Senate impeachment trial process by “evidence committee.” Only 12 senators heard live testimony while 88 senators avoided jury duty in favor of later having access to a cold record. All 100 Senators then voted – thumbs up or down. Hardly the Framers’ vision of the upper legislative chamber transformed into the nation’s High Court of Impeachment. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the textual commitment of authority to the Senate was absolute.

The Court refused to play semantic games: “[T]he word ‘try’ in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority

which is committed to the Senate.” *Nixon*, 506 U.S. at 239. Similarly, the terms “the Recess” and “Vacancies that may happen” in the Recess Appointment Clause of Article II, Section 2, do not provide an identifiable textual limit on the exclusive authority which is committed to the President. The Recess Appointment Clause’s textual commitment of exclusive authority to the President is of the same non-reviewable quality as that of the Impeachment Trial Clause to the Senate.

This Court should also readily determine that “there is no separate provision of the Constitution that could be defeated” by allowing the President “final authority” to utilize his temporary appointment authority. *Id.* at 237. It is important to underline that no individual rights claims are, or could be, presented by the Respondent’s challenge.¹⁶

B. Conflicted-Out: Judiciary as Final Arbiter of “Important Constitutional Check” on Judiciary

From a prudential perspective,¹⁷ Respondent’s challenge presents a significant conflict-of-interest for

¹⁶ It remains an open question whether Judge Nixon’s lawyer should have emphasized his individual rights claims (due process or attainder).

¹⁷ The purest “prudential strain” of nonjusticiability abstention incubates in Alexander Bickel’s *The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics*, 183-197 (1962); see generally, Fritz Scharpf, *Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis*, 75 Yale L.J. 517 (1966).

the judiciary. Although the instant challenge involves agency appointments rather than judicial, the nonjusticiability standard should be uniform as to all temporary appointments; the Framers chose not to have a distinct appointment process for judges and other officers. The Executive has frequently used the unilateral authority to fill Article III judgeships. More than 300 justices and judges have risen to the federal bench by recess commission, including such notable jurists as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Augustus Hand, Earl Warren, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Griffin Bell. George Washington used recess commissions to fill judgeships created by the first Judiciary Act. Thomas Jefferson recess appointed ten federal judges and thirty Justices of the Peace – including twenty-five jurists whom John Adams had nominated and the Federalist Senate had earlier confirmed as “midnight” judges.¹⁸ The Republic’s first five Presidents recess appointed over thirty federal judges, including five Supreme Court justices.

The *Nixon* opinion prudently acknowledged: “Judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is counter-intuitive because it would eviscerate the ‘important constitutional check’ placed on the Judiciary by the

¹⁸ The doubly-disappointed William Marbury received neither delivery of his ordinary commission from Adams, nor a recess commission from Jefferson. See David F. Forte, *Marbury’s Travail: Federalist Politics and William Marbury’s Appointment as Justice of the Peace*, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349, 400 (1996).

Framers.” *Nixon*, 506 U.S. at 235 (citations omitted). The majority cautioned that Judge Walter Nixon’s “argument would place final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to regulate.” *Id.* Similarly, the judiciary should be conflicted-out of being the final arbiter of the uniform process by which judges are strategically and most efficiently benched.

The appointment of new judges serves as an “important constitutional check” on the *status quo* of a given court and the judiciary as a whole.¹⁹ The Executive’s use of the authority to bench judges has a uniquely transformative history.²⁰ “Presidents have long used the recess appointment power to ease the way for putting well-qualified and distinguished judges from underrepresented groups on the federal bench.” Diana Gribbon Motz, *The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointment of Article III Judges*, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1665, 1680 (2011). William McKinley recess commissioned Jacob Triber to a trial bench in Arkansas as the nation’s first Jewish federal

¹⁹ Vacancies on an appellate bench obviously increase the *en banc* voting power and panel influence of the incumbent judges. The power of incumbent judges is significantly increased when bench vacancies are prolonged and numerous, such as the D.C. Circuit has experienced for over a decade. Judges should not be final arbiters of the President’s most efficient appointment method to “regulate” bench vacancies.

²⁰ See Victor Williams, *Estrada: Do a Recess Appointment*, Nat’l L.J. 12 (March 10, 2003).

judge. Woodrow Wilson recess appointed Samuel Alschuler as one of the first Jewish federal appellate jurists. Harry Truman utilized a recess commission to place the first African-American on the U.S. Court of Appeals, William Hastie. Four of the first five African-American federal appellate judges secured the bench by recess commission.

Seeking bench transformation during a period of reactionary Senate obstruction by regional factions of his own party, John F. Kennedy recess-appointed over twenty percent of his judges (with each winning subsequent confirmation). President Kennedy recess-commissioned seventeen judges on just one day – October 5, 1961. Thurgood Marshall was named to the Second Circuit on that day, providing the NAACP lawyer with much-needed protection for future harsh Senate confirmation ordeals. The first two women to rise to a federal district court were recess commissioned, including Sarah Hughes to a trial bench in Dallas, Texas. The only woman to administer the presidential oath of office, Judge Hughes, swore-in Lyndon Johnson at Dallas's Love Field inside Air Force One.²¹

President Johnson recessed appointed African-American judicial legends Spottswood Robinson, III and A. Leon Higginbotham. William Jefferson Clinton

²¹ See Mary L. Clark, *One Man's Token is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges*, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 487, 514 (2004).

placed the first African-American on the Fourth Circuit after being blocked for years from making a permanent appointment. On the eve of the 21st Century, President Clinton recess commissioned Roger Gregory “in the grand tradition of Presidents of both parties, dating all the way back to George Washington, who have used their constitutional authority to bring much needed balance and excellence to our Nation’s courts.”²²

III. Dense Political Thicket: Court’s Review Beyond Textual Commitment to Executive Requires Judicial Review of Appointment Obstruction – Holds, Filibusters, and House-Senate Scheduling Schemes

The instant adjudication is a continuation of an intense political conflict over Barack Obama’s appointments and governance. If this Court is to review the President’s exercise of recess appointment authority, it should also review the constitutionality of Senate minority confirmation obstruction – including holds and filibusters – that directly caused the emergency need for temporary appointments.

²² 36 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 3180 (Dec. 27, 2000), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-01-01/html/WCPD-2001-01-01-Pg3180.htm>.

A. Review of Obstruction that Led to Temporary Commissions

Amicus respectfully asserts “Senate inaction” fails to adequately describe how and why Craig Becker’s NLRB nomination was withdrawn, and a replacement recess commissioned. (*See* Pet. Brief at 3 n.1). Forceful, repeated Senate obstructionist action led to the Becker withdrawal. As with many other Barack Obama nominees, Becker, in his multiple nominations, faced months and years of very active confirmation tribulation. Arcane procedural hurdles, extreme slow walking, committee hearing tribulations, hundreds of written interrogatories, floor speech defamations, extortion holds, and silent filibusters are the regular order of Senate confirmation business. At the end of nominee Becker’s first confirmation travail, he received 52 favorable votes; a simple-majority constitutionally sufficient for Senate confirmation, but not the super-majority tabulation required for filibuster cloture.

Almost immediately after the President’s January 2012 appointments, the political conflict was moved to federal court fora. Battles began in jurisdictions all across the nation, and congressional obstructionists mounted a frontal attack in the instant action. Forty-two members of the Senate minority and the House Speaker filed amici briefs below to formally support the Respondent’s challenge. The 42 Senators also participated in oral argument below.

B. No Judicially Manageable Standards and No Respect Due

Once deep in the political thicket, however, the Court will find no manageable standards to define “recess,” to resolve the congressional interference with the Executive’s appointment obligation, to supervise the internal conflict among congressional factions, nor to measure how much deference is due the Senate when the President signs recess commissions, if any. This Court should not create or adopt a recess standard that would distinguish different types of Senate unavailability and that would attach constitutional weight to those various types of Senate breaks. *Nixon* explained that “the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.” *Nixon*, 506 U.S. at 228.

Judicial inquiry will necessarily focus on the 2011 congressional scheduling scheme to force the Senate to hold pro forma sessions every three days. A House freshmen faction orchestrated the stratagem with the express motive to “prevent any and all recess appointments by preventing the Senate from recessing for the remainder of the 112th Congress.”²³

²³ Victor Williams, *House GOP Can’t Block Recess Appointments*, Nat’l L.J. 39 (Aug. 15, 2011) (quoting Representative Jeff
(Continued on following page)

It is unlikely that this Court could undertake “independent resolution” of the obstruction and the President’s recess commission response “without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” *Baker*, 369 U.S. at 217. Outside adjudication, disrespect for the partisan confirmation dysfunction is past due.²⁴

C. Third Circuit’s *New Vista* Creates Nonjusticiability Conflict with Eleventh Circuit’s *Evans*

When rejecting a challenge to President George W. Bush’s recess appointment of Judge William Pryor, the *en banc* Eleventh Circuit ruled that the “controversial” aspect of the “blocked” confirmation “presents a political question.” *Evans v. Stephens*, 387 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005). The Eleventh Circuit refused to create a standard to measure “how much Presidential deference is due to the Senate when the President is

Landry, Letter to the Speaker of the House John Boehner, et al., June 15, 2011).

²⁴ See Hon. John G. Roberts, *Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 8* (2010) (“Each political party has found it easy to turn on a dime from decrying to defending the blocking of judicial nominations, depending on their changing political fortunes.”); See Oskar Garcia, *Kennedy: Judges’ Senate Confirmation Too Political*, A.P. The Big Story, Aug. 15, 2012, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kennedy-judges-senate-confirmation-too-political>.

exercising the discretionary authority that the Constitution gives fully to him.” *Id.*

Two prior challenges to recess appointed judges were rejected by lower courts fully *on the merits*. *United States v. Woodley*, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986) and *United States v. Allocco*, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963). Neither case, however, involved appointments with any degree of underlying confirmation conflict as here. And, unlike in *Evans*, neither opinion addressed nonjusticiability.

Most recently, the Third Circuit created a direct conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s nonjusticiability determination in *Evans* when deciding another challenge to Barack Obama’s NLRB recess appointments. *NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation*, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 2099742 (3d Cir. May 16, 2013). The court considered and rejected various political question arguments lodged by this amicus. *Id.* at 23-31. The panel majority ruled that judges – not the President – have final authority to dictate “when” the President may make a recess appointment. *Id.* at 28.

After rejecting Article II, Section 2’s textual commitment of the issue to the President, the two-judge panel majority minimized the relevance of this Court’s *Nixon* ruling, dismissed prudential concerns, and proclaimed discovery of “several manageable

standards” for resolution.²⁵ The majority conceded, however, that “there is no likely judicially manageable standard” to be found if the question is framed “as the amicus has” to include the underlying congressional obstruction that lead to the NLRB commissions. *Id.* at 29-30.

Declaring a question to be narrowly-framed does not make it so. Denying the breadth and context of the political question being asked does not alter the power usurpation of the answer. Nor does such judicial denial limit the answer’s disruptive political effects. By revoking the March 2010 recess appointment of Craig Becker, the court fouls every intrasession recess commission ever signed by any President – 329 such appointments made since 1981. The court taints unknown-thousands of official acts and judgments made by those officers and judges as *ultra vires*.

IV. Finality in Appointments

The nation’s extreme need for finality in appointment practice weighs heavily in favor of a broad political-question determination.

²⁵ A detailed dissent, which forcefully rebutted the whole of the majority’s merits opinion, also explained why the majority’s chosen intersession-only recess standard was “unworkable and not judicially manageable.”

A. Extreme Need for Finality

When *Nixon* was below, Judge Steven Williams wrote: “Although the primary reason for invoking the political question doctrine in our case is the textual commitment . . . , the need for finality also demands it.” *Nixon v. United States*, 938 F.2d 239, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The cost is chaos: “[T]he intrusion of the courts would expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” *Id.* at 246. The many challenges to the 2012 NLRB and CFPB commissions have already resulted in both political and economic disruptions. The intended and unintended consequences of the ruling below promise exponential chaos. As Judge Williams reasoned: “If the political question doctrine has no force where the Constitution has explicitly committed a power to a coordinate branch and where the need for finality is extreme, then it is surely dead.” *Id.*

B. *Goldwater v. Carter*’s Expedient Example

Barry Goldwater led a group of nine Senators and sixteen House members in suing President James Earl Carter for his controversial abrogation of a treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan). A district judge escalated the conflict by ruling that the President needed approval of two-thirds of the Senate, or a congressional majority, to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty. Amid increasing political turmoil, the *en banc* D.C. Circuit reversed on the

merits. The congressional delegation immediately sought *certiorari* review and the Solicitor General's response raised political question nonjusticiability – albeit in the alternative. Without allowing merits briefing and without scheduling oral argument, the Court issued a one-sentence summary order: “Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.” 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The high court process took all of ten days.

In a lead concurrence, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist explained: “[T]he basic question presented by the Respondent in this case is ‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable.” *Id.* at 1002. “Here, while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body’s participation in the abrogation of a treaty.” *Id.* at 1003. More so here, “while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate” in the confirmation of a permanent appointment, its next clause negates “that body’s participation” in the President’s signing of a temporary commission.²⁶ *Goldwater* sets the example for this Court’s prudent

²⁶ See Patrick Hein, *In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The Effectiveness of Political Counterweights*, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 235, 265-69 (2008) (referencing Laurence H. Tribe, *Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation*, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1273 (1995)).

and expedient withdrawal from this ongoing political conflict.



CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amicus argues that the petition for writ of *certiorari* should be granted to include a threshold nonjusticiability determination.

Respectfully submitted,

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